Quoting the then chief of state intelligence, D Sivanandan, now city commissioner, the committee said, "Another glaring systemic loophole was observed in the way intelligence from Central agencies is processed at the state level in the DGP's establishment."
Sivanandan told the committee that despite he being the nodal authority on intelligence in the state, all central intelligence alerts come first to DGP/CP with no copy marked to him. He comes to know of such alerts only if the DGP marks a copy to him. Even proceedings of Multi Agency Centre (MAC) were not marked to him.
The State Intelligence Department under him was not aware of any intelligence alert on terrorism prior to November 26, 2008 even though there were 17 alerts since August seven 2006 talking about possibility of sea-borne attacks and possibility of multiple and simultaneous attacks and three on the possibility of Fidayeen attacks.
The committee noted that after November 26, copies of intelligence alerts are being marked to the state intelligence chief.
The committee also found that security intelligence, especially on terrorism in Mumbai city, is handled by several officials: ATS, Additional Commissioner (Special Branch) and Additional Commissioner (Protection)."How to bring about co-ordination and cohesion in their working ought to be carefully examined by the CP with involvement of all concerned officials. We strongly advise that systems once placed should not be tampered by successors, as that seems to be one of the reasons, why in case of real emergency the instruments cannot be used. Revisions are necessary, but these should be done after careful study and involvement all concerned and not on whims of individuals," the report said.
