The Indian army was designed to be a loyal and a secular force devoid of any political affiliations, but times had changed. The 'virus of communalism' had spread in its ranks

When the prospects of Independence became brighter, it appeared to the Muslim League that neither the British nor the Congress would agree to the establishment of an Independent Muslim state. A civil war between the Muslims and the Hindus was a logical corollary which was likely to involve the Indian armed forces. And since the loyalty of the latter could not now be ensured implicitly the British decided to withdraw from India.

The threatened involvement of Indian troops in Hindu-Muslim fighting made the British even more unsteady and they decided to leave India definitely by June 1948. It was obvious that India could not remain united. It was already writ large in the shape of Hindu-Muslim fighting which had spread all over the country. The use of British troops in the civil war was effective, but the dilemma for the government was that it could not involve them in 'communal' fighting for long or bring adequate reinforcements from home.

The Indian army was designed to be a loyal and a secular force devoid of any political affiliations, but times had changed. The 'virus of communalism' had spread in its ranks. Some of the members of the armed forces were quick to assure their loyalty to the political leaders of their respective communities. There was also talk of jihad if the Muslim League was ignored or its demand rejected.

This was certainly going to involve the Muslim tribes of the Northwest India and possibly Afghanistan. In such an eventuality, the Indian armed forces could not be relied upon the their was a chance for the army to split and take sides of their co-religionists. Under these circumstances the British realised that if power was transferred to the Congress by-passing the Muslim League, the 'communal' fighting would be intensified and it would become difficult for the Europeans to extricate themselves from the interior of the country.

By early 1947, the Pakistan movement had become so strong that it could not be checkmated either by the British or the Hindus. Both of them, therefore, agreed to the division of India. But even after the acceptance the British tried to keep India united in some form. The main reason was that they did not want to divide the Indian armed forces. This was necessary not only for the security of the British lives and property in India but also for the future defence of the subcontinent from a possible Soviet threat and for their undisturbed use in an integrated system of the defence of the Commonwealth countries.

The British also needed a secure and a peaceful ally in India so that they could continue to use her naval and air bases. This was essential for the British to maintain their lines of communication with their colonies in the Far East. The British, therefore, did their best to impress upon the Muslim League leaders that they should not demand the division of the armed forces. They argued that from the economic, military and strategic points of view it was imperative that they must have a common army and a joint defence of Hindustan and Pakistan.

The Congress supported the move but the Muslim League firmly rejected the suggestion. Jinnah forcefully argued that if the defence of India was considered as one whole, the case of Pakistan would fall to the ground. Therefore, the Muslim League insisted on the division of the armed forces prior to Partition. It demanded an increase in the percentage of Muslim officers and men in the armed forces. The British, however, continued to side-track the issue and, even after the announcement of June 3, 1947 plan for the independence and the partition of India, Mountbatten insisted on some such arrangements or at least having a common governor-general of both Hindustan and Pakistan.

This demand was the logical conclusion of the British insistence on keeping India a united country with its armed forces undivided within the British Commonwealth. By having British officers, a British commander-in-chief and a British governor-general, they wished to maintain an all-British chain of command for as long as possible. The Muslim League firmly rejected a united army, a permanent joint defence agreement or a common governor-general which would have practically jeopardised the sovereign status of Pakistan. The Muslim League, therefore, succeeded in its struggle to achieve an independent and sovereign state notwithstanding the British and the Congress pressure.

Excerpted from Making of Pakistan: The Military Perspective, by Dr Noor-ul Haq, Reliance Publishing House, 1997, Rs 395, with the publisher's permission. Readers who wish to buy a copy of this book may write to Reliance Publishing House, 3026/7H, Ranjit Nagar, New Delhi 11 00 08.